Perspective of a Swedish Investor – Practical Differences in Structure, Liability and the Exercise of Shareholder Influence

Introductory remarks

From the perspective of a Swedish investor planning to establish operations in Poland or to invest in a Polish company, one of the key areas requiring analysis already at the structuring stage is the corporate governance model. This is not merely an organisational or formal matter. The chosen structure determines not only how decisions are made, but also the extent of shareholder influence, the relationship between shareholders and management, the level of autonomy granted to local executives, the way supervision over the company is exercised, and the scope of liability of individuals serving on corporate bodies.

In practice, differences in corporate governance are among the most frequent sources of misunderstanding in Polish-Swedish business relationships. This results from the fact that both systems use similar terminology – board, CEO, management, supervisory body – while assigning different legal meaning, different powers and different responsibilities to those bodies.

Management board in Poland as a corporate body

The Polish limited liability company is based on the continental European concept of separation between shareholders and the corporate bodies of the company. Under Article 201 §1 of the Polish Commercial Companies Code, the management board manages the affairs of the company and represents the company.

This principle is fundamental in Polish corporate law.

The management board represents the company itself as a separate legal entity. It does not represent the shareholders. It does not act as agent of the investor or as an extension of shareholder instructions. Once appointed, a member of the management board becomes part of the statutory governing body of the company and is legally required to act in the best interests of the company itself.

This distinction is often particularly important for foreign investors. Even where one shareholder holds all shares in the company, the management board does not legally represent that shareholder. It represents the company.

For Swedish investors, this often comes as a surprise, as in the Swedish governance structure shareholder influence is usually exercised more directly through the board.

The Swedish model: shareholders – board – CEO

In Sweden the chain of authority is structured differently. Shareholders appoint the board of directors at the general meeting. The board is responsible for the organisation of the company, strategic direction, governance and overall supervision of the business.

The board then appoints the CEO (verkställande direktör / VD). The CEO is therefore not appointed directly by shareholders, but by the board, and manages the day-to-day operations of the company within the framework determined by the board.

In practical terms, the structure can be summarised as follows: shareholders appoint the board, the board appoints the CEO, and the CEO manages the daily operations.

As a result, the Swedish board remains the central instrument through which shareholder influence is exercised and stays closely connected to strategy and leadership of the company.

Polish supervisory board versus Swedish board – two different governance models

A particularly important distinction for Swedish investors is that the Polish supervisory board (rada nadzorcza) is not the equivalent of a Swedish board of directors.

Although the terminology may suggest a similarity, these are structurally and functionally different corporate bodies.

In Poland, the supervisory board is a body of supervision and control. Its role is to supervise the company’s activities and oversee the management board. It may review company documents, request information, assess management activities, examine financial statements and exercise supervisory powers resulting from law or the articles of association.

However, it does not manage the affairs of the company. It does not conduct day-to-day operations and, as a rule, does not issue operational instructions to the management board concerning the running of the business.

This differs fundamentally from the Swedish board. The Swedish board combines strategic, organisational and supervisory functions. It appoints the CEO, determines the framework within which the CEO operates and remains much closer to the business and strategic decision-making process.

For a Swedish investor this distinction is highly relevant in practice. Assuming that a Polish supervisory board functions in the same way as a Swedish board may lead to an incorrect understanding of where actual control over the company is exercised.

Articles of association and the exercise of shareholder influence

In Poland, actual shareholder influence is exercised primarily through corporate rights and through the articles of association.

Members of the management board are appointed and removed by shareholders’ resolution unless the articles of association provide otherwise. This reservation is particularly important from an investor’s perspective.

In practice, the articles of association are the key legal instrument shaping shareholder relations and the real governance framework of the company. They may regulate appointment and dismissal rights, individual nomination rights, veto rights, reserved matters requiring shareholder or supervisory board approval, reporting obligations, transfer restrictions and broader governance mechanisms.

As a result, the real level of investor control in Poland often depends not only on the percentage of shares held but on the quality and precision of the constitutional corporate documentation.

Entering the Polish market – S24 incorporation, shelf companies and the role of the notary

Polish law provides considerable flexibility when entering the market. A limited liability company may be incorporated online through the S24 electronic registration system with a minimum share capital of PLN 5,000. If the filing is properly prepared, registration may be completed within a very short timeframe.

At the same time, in transactional practice it is also common to acquire so-called shelf companies – entities already incorporated and prepared for acquisition. This solution is typically used where timing is critical, where certain corporate history is required, or where a company must be immediately ready for closing or restructuring.

Where such business reasons do not exist, a newly incorporated company is often the more practical solution.

Regardless of the chosen route, adapting the corporate documentation after incorporation or acquisition is usually essential, particularly the articles of association, as standard template documentation rarely reflects the governance needs of a specific investor structure.

The role of the notary also remains significant in Poland, particularly with respect to amendments to the articles of association, share transfers and many ownership or restructuring transactions.

Liability of management board members in Poland

Liability of management board members remains one of the most important practical issues for investors.

As a general rule, the company itself is liable for its obligations as a separate legal entity. However, Polish law also provides situations in which liability may extend personally to members of the management board.

Particularly important is Article 299 of the Polish Commercial Companies Code. If enforcement against the company proves ineffective, members of the management board may become jointly and severally liable for the company’s obligations.

Although this does not automatically mean personal liability in every case, it creates real financial exposure for management board members and remains one of the most important legal risk factors connected with serving on a Polish management board.

In litigation practice it is also common for claims to be brought not only against the company itself but also – in parallel or alternatively – against members of the management board. In practice, the full management board is often included in disputes together with the company already at an early procedural stage.

Delegation of responsibilities and internal allocation of authority

Given the scope of liability, internal governance organisation becomes particularly important.

In practice, companies frequently adopt management board resolutions, internal regulations or a matrix of authority assigning responsibility for specific business areas to individual board members or functional directors responsible for finance, sales, procurement, compliance, operations or HR.

Such allocation does not automatically remove statutory liability. However, it has major practical value. It helps evidence the actual division of responsibilities within the organisation, supports internal governance and supervision and may also be relevant in litigation.

Where a board member can demonstrate that a particular area was assigned to another responsible person, that they had no decision-making authority in that area and no actual influence over the relevant conduct, this may be taken into account when assessing liability.

A properly documented allocation of authority therefore remains one of the key practical tools for managing governance and reducing management risk in Poland.

Discharge from liability and annual approval of actions of corporate bodies

Another important governance comparison concerns the annual approval of the actions of corporate bodies.

In Sweden, shareholders at the general meeting resolve on discharge from liability (ansvarsfrihet) for members of the board and the CEO. This serves as an important shareholder governance mechanism through which shareholders formally assess performance of those responsible for strategic management and operational leadership.

In Poland, the equivalent mechanism is absolutorium.

At the annual shareholders’ meeting, shareholders adopt resolutions granting discharge to members of the management board and – where established – members of the supervisory board in respect of performance of their duties during the previous financial year.

This reflects the dual structure of the Polish corporate governance model, where shareholders separately assess the performance of the management board as the body managing and representing the company, and the supervisory board as the body supervising the company’s activities.

Liability of the board and CEO in Sweden

In Sweden liability is structured differently because the allocation of functions is different.

The board remains responsible for the organisation of the company, strategic direction and supervision. The CEO remains responsible for day-to-day operational management within the framework established by the board.

Although certain responsibilities may be delegated, the board retains overall responsibility for supervision and governance of the company.

Liability is therefore assessed in light of board instructions, CEO instructions, delegation principles, decision-making processes and internal reporting lines between the board and the CEO.

Employee representation

A further structural difference concerns employee representation.

In larger Swedish companies employees may have representatives on the board. In practice, however, such representatives usually remain in the minority compared with shareholder-appointed members and generally do not determine the outcome of board decisions.

In a Polish limited liability company, employees do not typically participate either in the management board or the supervisory board. Employee interests are generally represented outside the corporate body structure, primarily through labour law mechanisms and trade unions.

Practical conclusions for Swedish investors

For Swedish investors, entering Poland requires more than choosing the appropriate legal vehicle. It requires careful and deliberate governance design.

The key practical point is understanding that the Polish management board is not the equivalent of the Swedish CEO, the Polish supervisory board is not the equivalent of the Swedish board of directors, and actual shareholder influence in Poland is exercised primarily through well-drafted constitutional documentation and carefully structured governance arrangements.

In practice, it is the articles of association, appointment mechanisms, allocation of powers, reporting framework and internal division of responsibilities that determine investor protection, effective shareholder control and long-term stability of operations in Poland.

4 timelines of implementation of the AI Act

On 10 June 2025, the European Parliament published an “At a Glance” factsheet detailing the implementation timeline of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), the world’s first comprehensive AI regulatory framework. The document sets out the Act’s history, purpose, core provisions and, above all, the staggered schedule by which its requirements will enter into force across the European Union.

Background and Purpose

The AI Act was formally adopted by the European Parliament on 13 March 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 12 July 2024, entering into force twenty days later (1 August 2024). It establishes a risk-based regulatory regime for AI systems, dividing them into “unacceptable,” “high,” “limited” and “minimal” risk categories. Its overarching goal is to ensure that AI deployed in the EU is safe, transparent and respectful of fundamental rights, while fostering innovation across the single market.

What the Factsheet Includes

The factsheet serves as a concise guide to:

  • History & Purpose: tracing the AI Act from proposal (April 2021) through political agreement (December 2023) to adoption and entry into force.
  • Key Provisions: outlining definitions (Chapter I), prohibited practices (Chapter II), high-risk system rules (Chapter III), general-purpose AI obligations (Chapter V) and enforcement mechanisms (Chapter IX).
  • Staggered Implementation Steps: detailing when each set of rules becomes applicable, culminating in full effectiveness by 2027.

Timeline of Implementation

  • 2 February 2025
    • Chapters I (general provisions) and II (prohibited AI practices) enter into force.
    • European Commission publishes non-binding guidelines on prohibited practices, clarifying, for instance, bans on social scoring, predictive policing and real-time biometric identification in public spaces.
  • 2 May 2025
    • Completion of the Code of Practice for General-Purpose AI (GPAI) models—covering large language models and other foundation models—either by industry consensus or, failing that, EU Commission intervention.
  • 2 August 2025
    • Entry into force of:
      • Designation of notified bodies and authorities for high-risk AI systems;
      • Obligations for GPAI model providers (governance, transparency, technical documentation, incident reporting);
      • Penalties regime (excluding fines specific to GPAI models);
      • Confidentiality requirements in post-market monitoring.
  • 2 February 2026
    • Commission issues guidelines on the classification rules for high-risk AI systems (Article 6), providing practical examples and clarifying Annex III criteria.
  • 2 August 2026
    • General application date for the remainder of the AI Act, including fines for GPAI model breaches and all high-risk system requirements in Annex III—except Article 6(1), which has a later deadline.
    • By this date, national authorities must be fully empowered to enforce the Act across Member States.
  • 2 August 2027
    • Entry into force of Article 6(1) (classification rules for high-risk AI systems embedded into regulated products) and Annex I obligations, marking the completion of the Act’s phased rollout.

Significance and Next Steps

This staggered approach balances the need for rapid prohibition of the most dangerous uses of AI with practical lead times for industry, regulators and Member States to adapt. Over the next two years, stakeholders must:

  1. Audit and Classify all AI systems and GPAI models in use (2 February 2025)
  2. Develop Compliance Frameworks: risk management, documentation, human-oversight mechanisms and AI literacy programs for personnel (2 February 2025)
  3. Engage with Guidelines: monitor Commission publications and standardization efforts (e.g., CEN-CENELEC harmonized standards due end-2025).

By 2 August 2027, the EU will have achieved a fully operational, risk-based AI regulatory regime, setting a global precedent for trustworthy AI governance.

Implementation timeline factsheet (PDF, European Parliament):
“The timeline of implementation of the AI Act” (At a Glance series, June 2025)
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/772906/EPRS_ATA%282025%29772906_EN.pdf

Poland Eyes Crypto Hub Status as Coinbase Grapples with Illinois BIPA Lawsuit

Coinbase Faces Class-Action over Biometric Privacy

On May 13, 2025, three Illinois residents—Scott Bernstein, Gina Greeder and James Lonergan—filed a federal class-action lawsuit against Coinbase, alleging that its Know-Your-Customer (KYC) identity-verification processes violate the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). They claim that by requiring users to upload a government-issued photo ID and a selfie, then routing those images through third-party facial-recognition vendors (including Jumio, Onfido, Au10tix and Solaris) without first providing written notice or obtaining informed consent, Coinbase “wholesale[ly] collects […] faceprints” in clear breach of BIPA’s disclosure and consent provisions.

Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that Coinbase has never published a retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers, another express requirement under BIPA. They further allege that over 10,000 individual arbitration demands over the same issue were dismissed after Coinbase allegedly refused to pay American Arbitration Association fees, effectively sidestepping those users’ claims. The suit seeks statutory damages of $5,000 per willful or reckless violation, $1,000 per negligent violation, injunctive relief, and reimbursement of litigation costs.

Poland’s Opportunity to Become a Crypto Hub

Meanwhile, in Katowice at the European Economic Congress, President of Binance Poland, argued that Poland is no longer a “niche” player but on track to become a major European crypto hub. Polish crypto-asset users numbered around 3 million just last year and may now exceed 4 million—remarkably close to the roughly 5 million retail brokerage accounts in the country—underscoring widespread adoption and public openness to digital-asset innovation.

Yet, Poland remains one of the few EU member states yet to implement local legislation to transpose the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation into national law. By integrating robust legal compliance for exchanges and crafting forward-looking domestic rules, Europe’s crypto ecosystem—including Poland—can both protect users and retain innovation in an increasingly competitive global landscape.